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The scenario posed by Professor Batey for this "mini-symposium" is played
out more often that we might care to admit. A person arrested with drugs offers to
"cooperate" against a figure the arrestee says is a bigger fish. Call the arrestee the
"cooperator." Who knows if she is telling the truth-and more importantly, who
decides that question and how does it affect lawyers' actions? The dearth of clear
and specific ethical guidance for the defense attorney here is surprising, and makes
Professor Batey's efforts here a real public service. But, at least to this former
prosecutor and current ABA Reporter on Prosecutorial Standards,' the scenario is
incomplete: where is the prosecutor? And more relevantly for current purposes,
what guidance is available for the prosecutor's ethical performance in this
scenario?
Too often, legal ethicists pose hypothetical questions for only one actor in our
legal system.2  But, for better or worse, we operate within a criminal justice
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I In 1999, I published an article bemoaning the lack of specific ethical guidance for
prosecutors operating in the now-common investigative context. Rory K. Little, Proportionality as
an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 738-46
(1999). In response to the issues raised there, in 2002 the ABA Standards Committee formed a Task
Force to formulate new Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecutor Acting as Investigator (I served
as a member of that Task Force, chaired by Ronald Goldstock and the Reporter was Steven Solow),
leading to the ABA's 2008 adoption of new Criminal Justice Standards on the topic. See ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS, available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pinvestigate.html [hereinafter PROSECUTORIAL
INVESTIGATIONS STANDARDS]. The Prosecutorial Investigations Standards are reprinted as an
Appendix to this essay, the first "hard copy" printing of them in any forum, infra at 694.
Meanwhile, in 2005, the ABA Standards Committee formed a different Task Force to
recommend revisions to the entire set of the existing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993). I have served as Reporter to that
Task Force (chaired by the Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Court Judge for the
District of Minnesota) from its inception, and the Task Force's proposals are currently being
considered within the ABA.
2 Although the scenario we address here is hardly hypothetical. See, e.g., Carriger v.
Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), in which the prosecution granted immunity to an
informant and made him its "star witness," who then perjuriously (it seems) testified that Carriger
had committed a murder which, in fact, the informant apparently had committed. Id. at 482. Carriger
was not relieved from his death penalty until the second en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit,
nineteen years later. Whether the informant (described as a "habitual liar with a sociopathic
personality") had a lawyer and whether that lawyer knew or suspected that his client's testimony was
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system,3 and the actions of every actor are inevitably affected by the actions of
others. Defense counsel does not, and should not, operate in a vacuum in this
scenario. The prosecutor has an important role to play, both in advising the
arrestee and her counsel to allow them to make their own choices, and in
preventing injustice to the extent she properly can.4
This scenario provides an opportunity to take note of the new Criminal Justice
Standards5 on Prosecutorial Investigations, adopted by the ABA in February 2008
and still not yet published with full Commentary.6 It also permits us to consider
the ethical interaction between defense and prosecution lawyers. Such interaction,
I submit, is a good and healthy thing-yet often ignored in a too-hostile "we versus
they" approach to the practice of criminal law. Finally, I submit that the judiciary
has a role to play here too-and that all three players need to consider their
functions and roles in a system for which legislators often mandate sentencing
regimes and other incentives that deeply affect the process as well as the end
result.
In brief, I submit that the prosecutor in this scenario has ethical obligations to:
1. Advise defense counsel and the arrestee fully of the potential
consequences of their decisions and actions here;
perjurious, is not reported. Id. at 466. Regardless, the Court held that "[w]hen the state decides to
rely on the testimony of such a witness, it is the state's obligation" to investigate the informant and
learn of adverse information. Id. at 480.
3 The for-worse side of having a criminal justice "system" was disturbingly described in Tom
Wolfe's classic The Bonfire of the Vanities 104-32 (1987).
4 "Properly" means within the bounds of existing lawyer ethics rules. For example, a vexing
question for prosecutors which I address here only in passing is what should a prosecutor do if s/he
believes that a defense counsel is acting ineffectively, and not accurately or fully conveying the
prosecutor's communications to the defendant? See text after n. 11, infra. ABA Rule of Professional
Conduct 4.2 forbids the prosecutor to contact the defendant directly except in narrow circumstances,
and the Sixth Amendment likely forbids interference with the defendant-counsel relationship.
Similarly, obligations of confidentiality may prevent a prosecutor from conveying some information
to the defense that the defense would like to have-another issue I do not address here.
5 In a project begun in 1964 under then ABA-President (and future U.S. Supreme Court
Justice) Lewis Powell, the ABA publishes Criminal Justice "Standards" to guide lawyers on various
criminal justice topics. For many years, the Standards project has been ably assisted by Susan
Hillenbrand of the ABA's Criminal Justice section, and there are currently 23 "Titles," or different
sets of standards, with others currently under consideration. See ABA Criminal Justice Section,
Criminal Justice Standards, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
Although the Standards have no binding authority until and unless adopted as law by a particular
jurisdiction, they have been persuasive and influential in American courts of all levels, including the
United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1041 (1990) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
6 See PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS STANDARDS, supra note 1; see also Criminal Justice
Standards, supra note 5 ("Commentary to these Standards is currently being developed and once it is
approved by the Standards Committee will accompany these 'black letter' Standards in a published
volume."). Also, see the Appendix to this Essay, infra at 694.
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2. Demand cooperation not just about the "kingpin," but about the
supplier(s) of the specific drugs found on the arrestee, and all other
relevant matters;
3. Not agree to any reduced charge or sentence7 without first obtaining
truly independent and incriminating corroboration of the arrestee's
proposed testimony, and being personally convinced that the
testimony is true; and
4. Not proceed further without the first three items.
All this is to say that the defense attorney is hardly the sole, or even primary,
guarantor of truth and justice here. Indeed, within the American context of an
adversary system with zealous Sixth-Amendment-protected defense lawyers, one
may argue (and my fellow contributors undoubtedly have) that the defense lawyer
is not supposed to guarantee truth at all. If the "system" is to work as the average
American thinks it should-and it is that largely non-lawyer American "public"
that the prosecutor, and not the defense attorney, represents-then the prosecutor,
(as well as the judge) has a major role to play in our not-really-hypothetical
scenario.
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S GENERAL ROLE
Two aspects of the prosecuting attorney's role are vital for the ethical success
of the American criminal justice system. First, the American prosecutor is a public
prosecutor: s/he represents "the public," not any single individual and certainly not
law enforcement interests alone.8 And second, the prosecutor has some general
duty to work toward truth, fairness, and "just" results. Thus the new ABA
Investigations Standards echo other authorities in beginning with a general
7 Our hypothetical does not explain how the prosecutor can guarantee a reduced sentence, as
opposed to recommend it to the judge. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 I(c)(1)(C) allows such
an agreement, but only if the judge agrees. In this aspect, the judicial officer has an important ethical
role to play: not accept a guilty plea and a required-reduced sentence without a substantial basis for
believing that the "deal" is a fair and honest one. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON PLEAS
OF GUILTY § 14-3.3 ("Responsibilities of the Judge").
8 PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 1.2(b). As is true of any
legal question, whether "the public" is the correct description of the prosecutor's "client" is arguable
(and parenthetically, I ask my students never to use the word "arguable," because virtually any legal
assertion is "arguable"--the adjective tells us nothing). Certainly American ethical authorities have
for decades, if not centuries, agreed that public prosecutors represent interests broader and less
individualized than their own or than law officers'. I prefer to describe the prosecutor's client as "the
public, acting through its designated representatives," to ensure that prosecutors generally follow a
supervisory hierarchy and seek guidance through our chosen democratic selection mechanisms rather
than simply public opinion polls or their personal, individual conceptions of "justice."
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principle that "the primary duty" of the prosecutor, even in the largely non-public,
confidential investigative stage, "is to seek justice."9
But, with apologies to respected "Minister of Justice" advocates, this general
principle is hardly sufficient to guide prosecutors in any useful, specific way.' 0 It
is all well and good to say that a prosecutor is a "minister of justice," but "justice"
is individualistically, and thus unacceptably manipulably, different in the eyes of
different beholders. That is, some might argue that a "just" result here is simply
the conviction and removal from our streets of the "drug kingpin," and so long as
we are "certain" of his badness, a little perjury along the way is not such a bad
thing in proportion to the harm he has done and will do to society. A duty to "seek
justice" is too vague, and too result-oriented, to satisfy us in most specific
situations. Prosecutors are human, and need more specific guidance than that if
their humanity is to be cabined in furtherance of truth and justice.
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO ACCURATELY ADVISE ABOUT UNPLEASANT
REALITIES
Our profession has (for reasons that in my view are sometimes more self-
interested than just, although that's a different article1 1) rules that prohibit direct
communication from the prosecutor to the arrestee who is represented by counsel,
as this one is. Within the context of those rules, I think a prosecutor's first duty in
this situation is to make sure the potential cooperator is advised as accurately as
possible about what she may be getting into. That is, the prosecutor needs to
convey a few important things to the arrestee (or her counsel, assuming honest
communication between counsel and client 12), before going further with the deal.
First, "in for a penny, in for a pound." That is, once "cooperation" is on the
menu, it has to be complete, and no topic will be out of bounds. "Full"
cooperation means full, and line-drawing-between, just for example, the supplier
on the deal she got arrested for, and the "drug kingpin" she's offering testimony
on; or between her own sordid history of drug-dealing, with anyone and everyone,
9 PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 1.2(a).
10 What fun is a law review symposium without a little academic-rivalry spice? My friends
and more prolific colleagues, Bruce Green and the late Fred Zacharias, have championed the
"Minister of Justice" concept. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice "?, 26
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612 n.8, 613 n.17 (1999); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991). I don't
so much disagree with what they say about that concept as I think it inadequate to be of much help in
any particular real-world criminal justice situation.
11 That is, I believe that Rule 4.2 is often self-interestedly employed to protect lawyers'
financial interests in not losing their clients via outside interference. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. &
Dana Remus Irwin, Toward a Revised 4.2 No-Contact Rule, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 797, 803-04 (2009)
(noting that "the Rule can also serve less legitimate interests of the lawyer"). On Rule 4.2 in the
criminal law context, see generally Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal
Prosecutors?, 65 FoRDHAM L. REV. 355 (1996).
12 See supra note 4.
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and the kingpin's-is not permitted. And all that information could end up being
used against her. So the decision to "come over to the other side" has to be a
complete one. Don't think you can "protect" yourself or others by telling the
prosecutor selective versions or portions of your world. Your world is now our
world.
Second, her information must be entirely truthful. That's two words.
Truthful. And entirely. Lies about anything, even small details, won't be
tolerated. And "misremembering" is likely to be considered lying, so don't lie
now and then try later to claim "I misremembered" if caught. Further, being
caught lying will void the deal, and almost certainly lead to more time in prison
and possibly additional perjury or obstruction ofjustice felony charges.
Third, "the prosecutor is not your friend." He does not like you and he does
not trust you. He will be very angry if you lie, and will enjoy putting you in prison
for it. And he will be actively seeking corroboration for everything you say. Not
to mention the efforts that the kingpin's lawyer will employ to try to prove you are
a liar-and the prosecutor will be listening to the kingpin's lawyer as actively as he
listens to yours. 13 Discovery of "corroboration" that does not corroborate, but
rather contradicts, will lead to much worse consequences for you.
14
The prosecutor should give all this advice to the defense attorney, even if the
experienced defense attorney may be assumed to know it, and expressly demand
that it be conveyed to the arrestee. A written letter, perhaps one that is developed
as somewhat "standard" for the prosecutor's office and then "tweaked" for each
individual case, might be considered. Moreover, to ensure that the defendant hears
all of this personally, I would recommend a personal meeting (with defense
counsel present) at which the arrestee's presence is required, at which the
prosecutor conveys this information without pulling any punches. (This also
avoids a later claim that defense counsel failed to convey the information. As I
instruct at every prosecutor's ethics seminar, good ethics is also always good
strategy. When teaching prosecutors, I challenge them to come up with real-life
examples in which following the best ethical course leads to strategic downfall. I
have yet to hear an example that holds water.)
III. COOPERATION SHOULD BE "FULL" AS WELL AS ENTIRELY TRUTHFUL
A prosecutor should not allow a cooperator to define the contours of the
cooperation. The public's interest should demand full cooperation about the
cooperator's entire criminal history, as well as truthfulness in every aspect. Again,
this is not just good ethics but also good strategy. The kingpin's lawyer will work
13 Thus the new Investigations Standards stress that the prosecutor should "reevaluate" his
judgments about who is credible, and "the veracity" of all witnesses as well as their "accuracy and
completeness" "throughout the course of the investigation." PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS
STANDARDS, supra note 1, §§ 1.4(a)(1)-(2).
14 See "Second," in the preceding paragraph.
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doubly hard to impeach the prosecution's star witness. There shouldn't be any
"surprises" on the stand. For example, our hypothetical doesn't mention that the
prosecution will receive any information about the drug dealing in which the
arrestee was caught red-handed. But that should be the first order of business here:
complete truthful information about the arrestee's own criminal conduct, as well as
naming names (and/or providing identifying details) about anyone else involved.
Or there is no deal.
In this regard, the new Investigations Standards say two very important
things. First, before entering any deal, the prosecutor must consider the very real
incentives the arrestee has to provide false, incomplete, or misleading
information.1 5 Such falsity could include seeking to inculpate the innocent, as well
as exculpate (or just leave out) others who in fact have culpability (e.g., the
arrestee's friends, relatives, lovers, or dangerous but as yet unknown bosses). And
although our hypothetical does not give specific sentencing numbers, in the federal
system the legislated ability to avoid inflexible mandatory minimums only by
providing "substantial assistance" creates very large, even if understandable,
incentives to lie.'
6
Although the Standards don't go on to discuss consequences, the logical
implication is that, when the incentives to lie are large and the lack of independent
corroborating evidence is persistent, some deals for testimony simply should not
be made. "[T]he prosecutor should be satisfied as to the truthfulness of the
cooperator."' 7 At some point, the prosecutor's ethical duty is to M ect proferred
testimony from a would-be cooperator, even when the target is "attractive" in some
law enforcement view, when the potential for false testimony is too large and
certainty of truthfulness cannot be reasonably assured. Prosecuting the violent
gangster Al Capone on relatively modest tax charges is fine. Prosecuting him by
using possible perjury is unethical.
Second, the prosecutor should "seek to have the cooperator plead guilty to an
appropriate criminal charge."'18  This naturally includes assessment of the
appropriate sentence, if sentence is part of the agreement (as in our hypothetical).
Appropriateness, like justice, is in the eye of the beholder, and reasonable
prosecutors will sometimes disagree. But no deal should be offered until a full
assessment of the cooperator's own criminality has been made. Thus the
15 PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 2.4(c).
16 See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926-27 (1999); Ronald Weich, The Battle
Against Mandatory Minimums: A Report from the Front Lines, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 94 (1996);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199 (1993). This
is one flaw, with anti-law enforcement effects, in legislatively-mandated mandatory-minimum
sentencing regimes that law and order advocates appear not to perceive. Prosecutors have no special
divine talent for "knowing" the truth, and mandatory minimums sometimes unacceptably skew the
criminal justice system's ability to accurately determine true, and relative, criminality.
17 PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 2.5(k).
18 Id. § 2.5(b) (emphasis added).
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Investigations Standards direct that before offering "significant benefits," a
prosecutor should determine "the culpability of other participants in the criminal
activity relative to the cooperator's culpability... as accurately as possible."' 9
This makes the "dance" between defense counsel and the prosecutor, prior to
signing a final cooperation bargain, dangerously intricate. The prosecutor should
not agree to anything specific until a full assessment of criminal culpability,
including relative criminal culpability, is made. Meanwhile, defense counsel does
not want to give up information about his client that is highly incriminating
without an enforceable promise of some significant benefit, assuming truthfulness.
The dance is not just a "two-step" but an intricate back and forth, each side moving
a bit closer to the other with each exchange, and often conducted via hypothetical
proffers that cannot easily be attributed to the cooperator personally until the deal
is sealed. Trust between the lawyers is essential to this process.
And for lawyers who are "repeat players," as criminal prosecutors and
defenders often are, a determination that a lawyer cannot be trusted in a particular
deal can be fatal to the overall effectiveness of that lawyer for a long, long time.
Thus, to state what I hope is obvious, honesty and fair-dealing between counsel is
essential to this process, for strategic, not to mention ethical, reasons. The
prosecutor has an obligation not to mislead defense counsel as to the likelihood of
a deal or particular sentence, simply to gather information. And the prosecutor has
an obligation to honestly enter into a deal, once defense counsel has proceeded
some incriminating distance down the road in reliance, assuming all stated
preconditions are met.
IV. INDEPENDENT, AND INDEPENDENTLY INCRIMINATING, CORROBORATION
SHOULD BE REQUIRED
Cognizant of space limitations, let me just say that no cooperation deal should
ever be the basis for a prosecution without independent corroborating evidence.
That is, while a prosecutor might ethically enter into a cooperation deal solely for
investigative, intelligence-gathering purposes, such a deal should not be entered
into as the basis for a prosecution unless truly independent corroborating evidence
is obtained, and that evidence is itself incriminating of the target. This can be
time-consuming, but prosecutors should not ethically buy a cooperator's "pig in a
poke," simply hoping that corroboration will later be obtained or based solely on a
"we all know it" type of knowledge that the ultimate target of the prosecution is
dirty.
Moreover, there is a difference between corroborating evidence that is truly
independent of a cooperator's information, and evidence that corroborates but is
itself intertwined with the "cooperation." Moreover, the corroboration should be
incriminating of the target-simply corroborating non-incriminating details of the
corroborator's testimony is a pretty thin reed on which to base a prosecution.
'9 Id. § 2.5(c)(7) (emphasis added).
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More can be said about this, and I have in the capital context.20 But space
limitations here control, and each case will differ factually as to what "counts" as
solid corroboration. I hope the general point is clear: no truly independent
corroboration, no deal. The possibility of perjury, and thus error and injustice, is
too high.
V. THE JUDGE'S ROLE
Even less is written about the judge's ethical role in criminal matters, than
about the prosecution. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct says nothing that is
relevant in any specific way here.21 Briefly, let me assert that the judge ought not
be a potted plant. While federal judges are told in Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure I l(c)(1) not to participate in plea discussions, they are also told to
"determine that there is a factual basis for the plea" (Rule 11 (b)(3)), and they may
reject a plea agreement they find not to be in the public interest (Rule 1 (c)(5)). 22 I
think this gives a judge latitude to inquire (in camera if necessary) as to the
fairness of a cooperation deal, and even into the relative culpability of a would-be
cooperator versus the ultimate targets of the prosecution. Of course, there are
serious separation of powers concerns here, and it is the Executive whose
constitutional obligation is to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Nevertheless, and particularly if anything specific should occur that might raise
questions about the deal, I think a fair-minded judge has the right to, and should,
make inquiries, and a fair-minded prosecutor has some obligation to respond.
VI. CONCLUSION
I don't want to renege on the requested hypothetical questions: I think the
defense counsel does have an ethical obligation to advise his client of all lawful
ways to mitigate the consequences of her criminality, and I think defense counsel
has an obligation not to assist knowingly in the presentation of false evidence.
However, I think time has proven correct the view of many authorities, that one
20 See Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful Convictions:
Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital Statutes, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 965, 980 (2008).
21 The ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct was first adopted in 1972, and was revised in
2007. The most it says for our scenario is, in a comment, that a judge should "ensure impartiality and
fairness to all parties." MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 1 (2007). The ABA has said a
little more about the "Responsibilities of the Judge" in its Pleas of Guilty Standards, § 14-3.3, but
again, nothing specific regarding my suggestions in the text here. See supra note 7.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Samueli, 582 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying "interest of
justice" standard to rejection of a Rule 1 (c) plea agreement); United States v. Moran, 452 F.3d 1167,
1171-72 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejection of plea for lack of a factual basis, even if discovered after
acceptance of the plea).
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frequently never "knows, 2 3 and that a client, once well and fully advised of the
consequences, has a right to proceed as s/he thinks best. Although if the client's
choice seems to be leading to perjury, defense counsel has an obligation to try to
dissuade, because perjury will never be in the client's best interests in the long run.
But defense counsel is not the only actor in the system. The "right" ethical
answer to hypotheticals like this are not unidimensional. They require a systematic
review of all the actors, and the prosecutor's role is not to be ignored.
23 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, My Client, the Cooperator, Lied: Now Wh7at?, 7 OfflO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 659 (2010); Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics
133, 142-48 (2008). As Professor Freedman has pointed out to me, this solution is more complicated
than my oversimplification in the text, or the average ethicist, reveals. Professor Freedman long ago
explained that "standards of 'knowing' have been manipulated in rules of lawyers' ethics" since the
client peijury dilemma was first analyzed. Id. at 142 & n.43 (citing MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
LAWYERS' ETHIcs iN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975)). In fact, Professor Freedman explains that
lawyers "frequently ... know" the truth, id. at 147-it is his position, however, that this ought not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that client peijury must be revealed. Id. at 136, 152-61 (arguing
that deliberate elicitation of such information, and then revealing it to the Court, is a constitutional
Fifth and Sixth Amendment violation). Other committed ethicists are more comfortable reaching the
same conclusion by maintaining that one never "knows" the truth sufficiently to reveal the criminal
defendant's confidences.
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ABA Criminal Justice Standards
on
Prosecutorial Investigations
Preamble
A prosecutor's investigative role, responsibilities and potential liability are
different from the prosecutor's role and responsibilities as a courtroom advocate.
These Standards are intended as a guide to conduct for a prosecutor actively
engaged in a criminal investigation or performing a legally mandated investigative
responsibility, e.g., serving as legal advisor to an investigative grand jury or as an
applicant for a warrant to intercept communications. These Standards are intended
to supplement the Prosecution Function Standards, not to supplant them. These
Standards may not be applicable to a prosecutor serving in a minor supporting role
to an investigation undertaken and directed by law enforcement agents.
PART 1: GENERAL STANDARDS
STANDARD 1.1 THE FUNCTION OF THESE STANDARDS
(a) These Standards address the investigative stage of the criminal justice
process. They address the charge or post-charge stages of the criminal justice
process only when those stages overlap with the investigative stage.
(b) These Standards are not intended to serve as the basis for the
imposition of professional discipline, nor to create substantive or procedural rights
for accused or convicted persons. These Standards do not modify a prosecutor's
ethical obligations under applicable rule of professional conduct. These Standards
are not intended to create a standard of care for civil liability, nor to serve as a
predicate for a motion to suppress evidence or dismiss a charge.
(c) The use of the term "prosecutor" in these Standards applies to any
prosecutor or other attorney, regardless of agency or title, who serves as an
attorney in a governmental criminal investigation.
STANDARD 1.2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(a) An individual prosecutor is not an independent agent but is a member
of an independent institution the primary duty of which is to seek justice.
(b) The prosecutor's client is the public, not particular government
agencies or victims.
(c) The purposes of a criminal investigation are to:
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(1) develop sufficient factual information to enable the prosecutor
to make a fair and objective determination of whether and what charges
should be brought and to guard against prosecution of the innocent, and
(2) develop legally admissible evidence sufficient to obtain and
sustain a conviction of those who are guilty and warrant prosecution.
(d) The prosecutor should:
(1) ensure that criminal investigations are not based upon
premature beliefs or conclusions as to guilt or innocence but are guided by
the facts;
(2) ensure that criminal investigations are not based upon partisan
or other improper political or personal considerations and do not
invidiously discriminate against, nor wrongly favor, persons on the basis
of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, political beliefs, age,
or social or economic status;
(3) consider whether an investigation would be in the public
interest and what the potential impacts of a criminal investigation might be
on subjects, targets and witnesses; and
(4) seek in most circumstances to maintain the secrecy and
confidentiality of criminal investigations.
(e) Generally, the prosecutor engaged in an investigation should not be the
sole decision-maker regarding the decision to prosecute matters arising out of that
investigation.
(f) The prosecutor should be aware of and comply with the ethical rules
and other legal standards applicable to the prosecutor's conduct during an
investigation.
(g) The prosecutor should cooperate with other governmental authorities
regarding matters that are of legitimate concern to such authorities when doing so
is permitted by law and would not compromise an investigation or other criminal
justice goals.
(h) The prosecutor's office should provide organizational structure to
guide its members' investigative work.
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STANDARD 1.3 WORKING WITH POLICE AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENTS
(a) The prosecutor should respect the investigative role of police and other
law enforcement agents by:
(1) working cooperatively with them to develop investigative
policies; and
(2) providing independent legal advice regarding their
investigative decisions.
(b) The prosecutor should take steps to promote compliance by law
enforcement agents with relevant legal rules.
(c) The prosecutor should be aware of the experience, skills and
professional abilities of police and other law enforcement agents assigned to an
investigation.
(d) The prosecutor's office should assist in providing training to police
and other law enforcement agents concerning potential legal issues and best
practices in criminal investigations.
(e) Before and throughout the course of complex or non-routine
investigations, the prosecutor should work with the police and other participating
agencies and experts to develop an investigative plan that analyzes:
(1) the investigative predicate or information concerning the
matter that is then known;
(2) the goals of the investigation;
(3) the potential investigative techniques and the advantages of
each, singularly and in combination, in producing relevant information and
admissible evidence; and
(4) the legal issues likely to arise during the investigation.
(f) The prosecutor should promote timely communications with police
and other law enforcement agents about material developments in the
investigation.
(g) The prosecutor should not seek to circumvent ethical rules by
instructing or recommending that others use means that the prosecutor is ethically
prohibited from using. The prosecutor may provide legal advice to law
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enforcement agents regarding the use of investigative techniques that law
enforcement agents are authorized to use.
STANDARD 1.4 VICTIMS, POTENTIAL WITNESSES, AND TARGETS DURING THE
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
(a) Throughout the course of the investigation as new information
emerges, the prosecutor should reevaluate:
(1) judgments or beliefs as to the culpability or status of persons
or entities identified as "witnesses," "victims," "subjects" and "targets,"
and recognize that the status of such persons or entities may change; and
(2) the veracity of witnesses and confidential informants and
assess the accuracy and completeness of the information that each
provides.
(b) Upon request and if known, the prosecutor should inform a person or
the person's counsel, whether the person is considered to be a target, subject,
witness or victim, including whether their status has changed, unless doing so
would compromise a continuing investigation.
(c) The prosecutor should know the law of the jurisdiction regarding the
rights of victims and witnesses and should respect those rights.
(d) Absent a law or court order to the contrary, the prosecutor should not
imply or state that it is unlawful for potential witnesses to disclose information
related to or discovered during an investigation. The prosecutor may ask potential
witnesses not to disclose information, and in doing so, the prosecutor may explain
to them the adverse consequences that might result from disclosure (such as
compromising the investigation or endangering others). The prosecutor also may
alert an individual who has entered into a cooperation agreement that certain
disclosures might result in violation of the agreement.
(e) The prosecutor should not imply the existence of legal authority to
interview an individual or compel the attendance of a witness if the prosecutor
does not have such authority.
(f) The prosecutor should comply with applicable rules and case law that
may restrict communications with persons represented by counsel.
(g) The prosecutor should not take into consideration any of the following
factors in making a determination of whether an organization has been cooperative
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in the context of a government investigation unless the specified conduct of the
organization would constitute a violation of law or court order:
(1) that the organization has provided, or agreed to provide
counsel to, or advanced, reimbursed or indemnified the legal fees and
expenses of, an employee;
(2) that the organization entered into or continues to operate under
a joint defense or information sharing and common interest agreement
with regard to the investigation;
(3) that the organization shared its records or other historical
information relating to the matter under investigation with an employee; or
(4) that the organization did not sanction or dischargean
employee who invoked his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination in response to government questioning of the employee.
(h) The prosecutor should not interfere with, threaten, or seek to punish
persons or entities seeking counsel in connection with an investigation, nor should
the prosecutor interfere with, threaten or seek to punish those who provide such
counsel unless by doing so such conduct would constitute a violation of law or
court order. A good faith basis for raising a conflict of interest, or for investigating
possible criminal conduct by the defense attorney, is not "interference" within the
meaning of this Standard.
STANDARD 1.5 CONTACTS WITH THE PUBLIC DURING THE INVESTIGATIVE
PROCESS
(a) The prosecutor should neither confirm nor deny the existence of an
investigation, or reveal the status of the investigation, nor release information
concerning the investigation, with the following exceptions:
(1) releasing information reasonably necessary to obtain public
assistance in solving a crime, apprehending a suspect, or calming public
fears;
(2) responding to a widely disseminated public call for an
investigation by stating that the prosecutor will investigate, or decline to
investigate the matter;
(3) responding to a law enforcement or regulatory matter of
significant public safety concern, by stating that the prosecutor will begin
an investigation or begin a special initiative to address the issue, or by
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releasing information reasonably necessary to protect public safety, subject
to restrictions in the law of the jurisdiction;
(4) announcing future investigative plans in order to deter criminal
activity;
(5) stating in an already publicized matter and where justice so
requires, that the prosecutor will not initiate, will not continue, or has
concluded an investigation of a person, entity, or matter and, if applicable,
has informed the subject or potential subject of the decision not to file
charges;
(6) responding to widely disseminated false statements that the
prosecutor is, or is not, investigating a person, entity, or matter;
(7) stating whether and when, if court rules so permit, an event
open to the public is scheduled to occur;
(8) offering limited comment when public attention is generated
by an event in the investigation (e.g., arrests, the execution of search
warrants, the filing of charges, or convictions), subject to governing legal
standards and court rules; and
(9) making reasonable and fair responses to comments of defense
counsel or others.
(b) Except as a proper part of a court proceeding and in accordance with
applicable rules, the prosecutor should not publicly make the following types of
statements or publicly disclose the following information about an investigation:
(1) statements of belief about the guilt or innocence, character or
reputation of subjects or targets of the investigation;
(2) statements that have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing a jury or jury panel;
(3) information about the character or reputation of a person or
entity under investigation, a prospective witness, or victim;
(4) admissions, confessions, or the contents of a statement or alibi
attributable to a person or entity under investigation;
(5) the performance or results of tests or the refusal or agreement
of a suspect to take a test;
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(6) statements concerning the credibility or anticipated testimony
of prospective witnesses; and
(7) the possibility or likelihood of a plea of guilty or other
disposition.
(c) The prosecutor should endeavor to dissuade police and other law
enforcement agents and law enforcement personnel from making public
information that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making public, or that
may have an adverse impact on the investigation or any potential prosecution.
PART 2: STANDARDS FOR SPECIFIC INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE
PROSECUTOR
STANDARD 2.1 THE DECISION TO INITIATE OR TO CONTINUE AN INVESTIGATION
(a) The prosecutor should have wide discretion to select matters for
investigation. Thus, unless required by statute or policy:
(1) the prosecutor should have no absolute duty to investigate any
particular matter; and
(2) a particularized suspicion or predicate is not required prior to
initiating a criminal investigation.
(b) In deciding whether an investigation would be in the public interest,
the prosecutor should consider, but not necessarily be dissuaded by, the following:
(1) a lack of police interest;
(2) a lack of public or political support;
(3) a lack of identifiable victims;
(4) fear or reluctance by potential or actual witnesses; or
(5) unusually complex factual or legal issues.
(c) When deciding whether to initiate or continue an investigation, the
prosecutor should consider:
(1) whether there is evidence of the existence of criminal conduct;
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(2) the nature and seriousness of the problem or alleged offense,
including the risk or degree of harm from ongoing criminal conduct;
(3) a history of prior violations of the same or similar laws and
whether those violations have previously been addressed through law
enforcement or other means;
(4) the motive, interest, bias or other improper factors that may
influence those seeking to initiate or cause the initiation of a criminal
investigation;
(5) the need for, and expected impact of, criminal enforcement to:
(i) punish blameworthy behavior;
(ii) provide specific and/or general deterrence;
(iii) provide protection to the community;
(iv) reinforce norms embodied in the criminal law;
(v) prevent unauthorized private action to enforce the law;
(vi) preserve the credibility of the criminal justice system; and
(vii)other legitimate public interests.
(6) whether the costs and benefits of the investigation and of
particular investigative tools and techniques are justified in consideration
of, among other things, the nature of the criminal activity as well as the
impact of conducting the investigation on other enforcement priorities and
resources
(7) the collateral effects of the investigation on witnesses,
subjects, targets and non-culpable third parties, including financial damage
and harm to reputation
(8) the probability of obtaining sufficient evidence for a successful
prosecution of the matter in question, including, if there is a trial, the
probability of obtaining a conviction and having the conviction upheld
upon appellate review; and
(9) whether society's interest in the matter might be better or
equally vindicated by available civil, regulatory, administrative, or private
remedies.
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(d) When deciding whether to initiate or continue an investigation, the
prosecutor should not be influenced by:
(1) partisan or other improper political or personal considerations.
_b_ the race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, political
beliefs or affiliations, age, or social or economic status of the potential
subject or victim, unless they are elements of the crime or are relevant to
the motive of the perpetrator; or
(2) hostility or personal animus towards a potential subject, or any
other improper motive of the prosecutor.
(e) The prosecutor's office should have an internal procedure to document the
reason(s) for declining to pursue prosecution following a criminal investigation.
STANDARD 2.2 SELECTIVE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
(a) The prosecutor should be familiar with routine investigative techniques
and the best practices to be employed in using them.
(b) The prosecutor should consider the use of costlier, riskier, or more
intrusive means of investigation only if routine investigative techniques would be
inappropriate, ineffective, or dangerous, or if their use would impair the ability to
take other desirable investigative steps. If non-routine techniques are used, the
prosecutor should regularly reevaluate the need for them and whether the use of
routine investigative techniques will suffice.
(c) The prosecutor should consider, in consultation with police and other
law enforcement agents involved in the investigation, the following factors:
(1) the likely effectiveness of a particular technique;
(2) whether the investigative means and resources to be utilized
are appropriate to the seriousness of the offense;
(3) the risk of physical danger to law enforcement officers and
others;
(4) the costs involved with various investigative techniques and
the impact such costs may have on other efforts within the prosecutor's
office;
(5) the possibility of lost opportunity if an investigative technique
is detected and reveals the investigation;
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(6) means of avoiding unnecessary intrusions or invasions into
personal privacy;
(7) the potential entrapment of otherwise innocent persons;
(8) the risk of property damage, financial loss to persons or
businesses, damage to reputation or other harm to persons;
(9) interference with privileged or confidential communication;
(10) interference with or intrusion upon constitutionally protected
rights; and
(11) the risk of civil liability or other loss to the government.
(d) The prosecutor should consider the views of experienced police and
other law enforcement agents about safety and technical and strategic
considerations in the use of investigative techniques.
(e) The prosecutor may consider that the use of certain investigative
techniques could cause the subject of the investigation to retain legal counsel and
thereby limit the use of some otherwise permissible investigative techniques.
(f) The prosecutor should avoid being the sole interviewer of a witness,
being alone with a witness, or otherwise becoming an essential witness to any
aspect of the investigation.
(g) While the prosecutor may, and sometimes should, seek changes in law
and policy, the prosecutor should abide by existing legal restraints, even if the
prosecutor believes that they unjustifiably inhibit the effective investigation of
criminal conduct.
STANDARD 2.3 USE OF UNDERCOVER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS AND
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS
(a) For the purpose of these Standards, an "undercover law enforcement
agent" is an employee of a government agency working under the direction and
control of a government agency in a criminal investigation, whose true identity as a
law enforcement agent involved in the investigation is concealed from third
parties.
(b) For the purpose of these Standards, an "undercover operation" means
an investigation in which undercover law enforcement agents or other persons
working with law enforcement conceal their purpose of detecting crime or
obtaining evidence to prosecute those engaged in illegal activities.
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(c) In deciding whether to use or to advise the use of undercover law
enforcement agents or undercover operations, the prosecutor should consider
potential benefits, including:
(1) the character and quality of evidence likely to be obtained; and
(2) the ability to prevent or solve crimes where obtaining reliable
and admissible evidence to do so would otherwise be difficult or
impossible to obtain.
(d) In deciding whether to use or to advise the use of undercover law
enforcement agents or undercover operations, the prosecutor should consider
potential risks, including:
(1) physical injury to law enforcement agents and others;
(2) lost opportunity if the operation is revealed;
(3) unnecessary intrusions or invasions into personal privacy;
(4) entrapment of otherwise innocent persons;
(5) property damage, financial loss to persons or businesses,
damage to reputation or other harm to persons;
(6) interference with privileged or confidential communications;
(7) interference with or intrusion upon constitutionally protected
rights;
(8) civil liability or other adverse impact on the government;
(9) personal liability of the law enforcement agents;
(10) involvement in illegal conduct by undercover law
enforcement agents or government participation in activity that would be
considered unsuitable and highly offensive to public values and that may
adversely impact a jury's view of a case; and
(11) the possibility that the undercover operation will
unintentionally cause an increase in criminal activity.
(e) The prosecutor advising an undercover investigation should:
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(1) consult with appropriate police or law enforcement agents on a
basis about the continued propriety of the operation and the legal
sufficiency and quality of the evidence that is being produced by the
operation;
(2) seek periodic internal review of the investigation to determine
whether the operation's benefits continue to outweigh its risks and costs,
including the extent to which:
(i) the goals of the investigation have been accomplished;
(ii) there is potential for the acquisition of additional useful and
non-duplicative information;
(iii) the investigation can continue without exposing the
undercover operation; and
(iv) continuation of the investigation may cause financial or other
injury to innocent parties.
(f) The prosecutor should seek to avoid or minimize the risks involved in
the active participation of undercover police or law enforcement agents in illegal
activity, and provide such agents guidance about authorized participation in
otherwise criminal conduct.
(g) Records of funds expended and generated by undercover activity
should be retained and accounted for in a manner that facilitates a comprehensive
and accurate audit.
STANDARD 2.4 USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
(a) As used in these Standards, a "confidential informant" is a person who
supplies information to police or law enforcement agents pursuant to an agreement
that the police or investigative agency will seek not to disclose the person's
identity. The identity of a confidential informant may also be unknown to the
prosecutor. A confidential informant may in some instances become a cooperator,
and in such circumstances reference should be made to Standard 2.5.
(b) The prosecutor should consider possible benefits from the use of a
confidential informant, including whether the confidential informant might enable
the government to obtain:
(1) first-hand, eyewitness accounts of criminal activity;
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(2) critical background information about the criminal activity or
criminal organization under investigation;
(3) information necessary to provide a basis for additional
investigative techniques or court-ordered means of investigation such as a
search warrant; and
(4) identification of witnesses or leads to witnesses who can
provide direction to further the investigation or valuable testimony to a
grand jury or at trial.
(c) The prosecutor should consider possible risks from the use of a
confidential informant. These include risks that the confidential informant will:
(1) be untruthful, or provide misleading or incomplete information;
(2) compromise the criminal investigation by revealing
information to others, including the subjects or targets of the investigation;
(3) engage in behavior constituting entrapment;
(4) commit or continue to commit crimes;
(5) be subject, or subject others, to serious risk of physical harm as
a result of cooperating with law enforcement; and
(6) interfere with privileged or confidential relationships or
communications or violate the rights of the investigation's subject.
(d) The prosecutor should avoid being alone with a confidential informant,
even for a brief period of time.
(e) Before deciding to rely upon the information provided by a
confidential informant for significant investigative steps, the prosecutor should
review the following with the police or law enforcement agents:
(1) the ability of the confidential informant to provide or obtain
information relevant to the criminal investigation;
(2) means of corroborating information received from the
confidential informant;
(3) the possible motives or biases of the confidential informant,
including the motive to gain a competitive advantage over others in either
criminal or legitimate enterprises;
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(4) the nature of any and all promises made to the prospective
confidential informant by other prosecutors, police or law enforcement
agents, including promises related to the treatment of associates or
relatives of the confidential informant;
(5) the prior history of the confidential informant, including prior
criminal activity and other information, including the informant's true
identity if necessary for the prosecutor's review;
(6) whether the prospective confidential informant is represented
by an attorney or is party to a joint defense agreement with other targets of
the investigation and, if so, how best to address potential legal or ethical
issues related to the representation or agreement;
(7) if reasonably available, the experience other prosecutors and
law enforcement agents have had with the confidential informant;
(8) whether the proposed compensation or benefits to be received
by the confidential informant are reasonable under the circumstances;
(9) the risk that the prospective confidential informant may be an
agent of the subjects of the investigation or of other criminal groups and
individuals, or may reveal investigative information to them; and
(10) the risk that the prospective confidential informant will
engage in criminal activity not authorized by the prosecutor, and the
seriousness of that unauthorized criminal activity.
(f) The prosecutor's office should work with police and law enforcement
agents to develop best practices and policies for the use of confidential informants
that include:
(1) a rule that investigative information obtained from other
sources should not be provided to the confidential informant unless doing
so would materially advance the investigation;
(2) prohibitions on making promises of compensation or other
benefits that would shock the conscience of a moral society or would risk
compromising the credibility of the informant in any proceeding in which
the informant's testimony may be important;
(3) prohibitions on making promises that the police or law
enforcement agents are unlikely to be able to keep;
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(4) routine instructions to confidential informants to refrain from
criminal conduct other than as directed by law enforcement; and
(5) the routine use of standard form agreements when such
agreements are entered into by law enforcement officers without the
involvement of the prosecutor.
STANDARD 2.5 COOPERATION AGREEMENTS AND COOPERATING INDIVIDUALS
AND ORGANIZATIONAL WITNESSES
(a) As used in these Standards, "cooperation agreements" are agreements
between the prosecutor and otherwise culpable individuals or entities
("cooperators") who provide the government with assistance useful to an
investigation in exchange for benefits. A cooperator may have been a confidential
informant earlier in the investigation.
(b) The prosecutor should ordinarily seek to have the cooperator plead
guilty to an appropriate criminal charge rather than provide the cooperator
immunity for culpable conduct.
(c) In deciding whether to offer a cooperator significant benefits,
including a limit on criminal liability, immunity, or a recommendation for
reduction of sentence, the prosecutor should consider whether:
(1) the cooperator is able and willing to provide valuable
assistance to the investigation;
(2) the cooperator will maintain the confidentiality or secrecy of
the investigation;
(3) the cooperator has biases or personal motives that might result
in false, incomplete, or misleading information;
(4) leniency or immunity for the criminal activity of the
cooperator is warranted by the goals of the investigation and the public
interest, including appropriate consideration for victim(s) interests;
(5) providing leniency, immunity or other benefits would be seen
as offensive by the public or cause a reasonable juror to doubt the veracity
of the cooperator's testimony;
(6) information that has been provided (such as through an
attorney proffer or by a debriefing of the cooperator) has been
corroborated or can otherwise shown to be accurate;
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(7) the culpability of other participants in the criminal activity
relative to the cooperator's culpability has been determined as accurately
as possible;
(8) there is a likelihood that the cooperator will provide useful
information only if given leniency or immunity;
(9) the case could be successfully prosecuted without the
cooperator's assistance; and
(10) the cooperator could be successfully prosecuted without the
admissions of the cooperator made pursuant to the agreement.
(d) The cooperation agreement should not:
(1) promise to forego prosecution for future criminal activity,
except where such activity is necessary as part of an officially supervised
investigative and enforcement program; or
(2) adversely affect third parties' legal rights.
(e) The prosecutor should:
(1) be aware that anything said to the cooperator might be
repeated to the cooperator's criminal associates or in open court; and
(2) be aware of the disclosure requirements under relevant law if a
cooperator ultimately testifies at trial, including disclosure of any and all
agreements and promises made to the cooperator and evidence which
could impact the cooperator's credibility, including the complete criminal
history of the cooperator. The prosecutor should take steps to assure the
preservation of such evidence.
(f) The prosecutor should recognize and respect the role of the
cooperator's attorney in the decision to cooperate and in the disposition of
significant legal rights.
(g) Ordinarily, a prosecutor who offers leniency in exchange for
cooperation should not withdraw or threaten to withdraw the offer because of the
potential cooperator's request to consult with counsel prior to deciding whether to
accept it. However, if the time required for the potential cooperator to consult with
counsel would render the agreement ineffective, the prosecutor may withdraw or
threaten to withdraw the offer before there is opportunity for such consultation. In
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that event, the prosecutor may condition cooperation on an immediate and
uncounseled decision to proceed.
(h) The prosecutor should reduce a cooperation agreement to writing as
soon as practicable. An agreement should only cover those crimes known to the
government at the time it is made, and should specify:
(1) the specific details of all benefits and obligations agreed upon;
(2) the specific activities to be performed by the cooperator;
(3) the requirement that the cooperator be truthful in dealing with
the government and in all legal proceedings;
(4) the prohibition against the cooperator's engaging in any
criminal conduct other than as directed by law enforcement;
(5) the extent of the disposition of the potential criminal and civil
claims against the cooperator;
(6) a complete list of any other promises, financial benefits or
understandings;
(7) the limitations of the agreement with respect to the terms it
contains and to the identified jurisdiction or jurisdictions; and
(8) the remedy in the event the cooperator breaches the agreement.
(i) The prosecutor should avoid being alone with a cooperator even for a
brief period of time.
(j) The prosecutor should guard against the cooperator obtaining
information from others that invades the attorney-client or work product privileges
or violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
(k) Prior to relying on the cooperator's information in undertaking an
investigative step that could cause adverse consequences to the investigation or to
a third party, the prosecutor should be satisfied as to the truthfulness of the
cooperator.
(1) If an investigative step involves an application to a court or other
official body, the prosecutor should make appropriate and required disclosures
about the cooperator to the court or other body.
[Vol 7:685
"IT'S NOT MY PROBLEM? "
(m) If the prosecutor suspects that the cooperator is not being truthful, the
prosecutor should take reasonable steps to address such concerns and seek further
corroboration of the cooperator's information.
(n) If the prosecutor determines that a cooperator has knowingly provided
false information or otherwise breached the cooperation agreement, the prosecutor
should:
(1) seek guidance from a supervisor;
(2) undertake or request the initiation of an investigation into the
circumstances;
(3) consider the possible prosecution of the cooperator, and;
(4) carefully reevaluate the investigation.
STANDARD 2.6 THE DECISION TO ARREST DURING A CONTINUING CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION
(a) In making a tactical decision whether, when or where to arrest a
subject during a continuing investigation, the prosecutor should consider the
potential benefits of the arrest, including:
(1) protecting the public from a person known to present an
imminent danger;
(2) reducing the likelihood of flight;
(3) preventing the destruction of evidence and providing an
opportunity to obtain evidence of a crime pursuant to a search incident to
arrest;
(4) stopping or deterring the harassment or coercion of witnesses
or other acts of obstruction of justice;
(5) creating an opportunity to ask questions about an unrelated
crime;
(6) encouraging other culpable individuals or witnesses to
surrender to law enforcement and to cooperate with the investigation;
(7) inducing relevant conversation or other communication likely
to be intercepted by law enforcement; and
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(8) protecting the existence of an undercover agent or confidential
informant, a cooperator or an undercover operation.
(b) In deciding whether, when or where to arrest a subject during a
continuing investigation, the prosecutor should consider the potential risks of the
arrest, including:
(1) limiting the continued conduct of a criminal investigation by
alerting others involved in continuing criminal activity;
(2) restricting the use of some investigative techniques;
(3) triggering speedy charge and speedy trial rules;
(4) triggering disclosure obligations that have been subject to
delayed notice;
(5) appearing to be illegitimate or pre-textual and thus adversely
affecting community support for police and prosecution efforts; and
(6) causing significant shame, embarrassment or prejudice to the
arrestee or innocent third parties and unintended and unfair financial
impacts.
(c) The prosecutor should be aware that Sixth Amendment right to counsel
issues raised by the filing of criminal charges may limit the availability of some
investigative options, including:
(1) use of the grand jury as an investigative technique;
(2) soliciting incriminating information from a charged individual;
and
(3) contacts with the individuals or entities who have been
charged.
STANDARD 2.7 USE OF SUBPOENAS
(a) As used in these Standards, a "subpoena," however named or
designated, is a written command for a person or entity to provide physical
evidence, testimony or documents. A subpoena may be issued by a prosecutor, a
court, a grand jury or a law enforcement agency, as provided by the law of the
jurisdiction.
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(b) In deciding whether to use a subpoena, the prosecutor should consider
potential benefits including:
(1) the conservation of law enforcement resources by requiring
others to search for and provide factual information and physical evidence
needed for an investigation;
(2) the imposition of an obligation on the subject of the subpoena
to provide factual information or physical evidence;
(3) the fact that no predicate or less of a showing is required to
issue a subpoena, as compared to a search warrant;
(4) the ability to delay or prevent a third party from voluntarily or
compulsorily disclosing information about the subpoena (including the
disclosure of either the fact of the subpoena itself or of any information
provided in response) as a means to preserve the secrecy of the
investigation if authorized by law; and
(5) voluntary disclosures or cooperation by witnesses and subjects
prompted by receipt of the subpoena.
(c) In deciding whether to use a subpoena, the prosecutor should consider
the following potential risks and ways to mitigate them:
(1) that evidence will be destroyed or altered in between receipt
and production;
(2) that information responsive to the subpoena will be improperly
withheld or that the request will be interpreted narrowly; and
(3) that knowledge of the subpoena will cause the subjects of the
investigation to disguise criminal activity, or take actions to impede or
obstruct the investigation.
(d) The prosecutor using a subpoena should:
(1) seek to limit the scope of the subpoena to the needs of the
investigation, avoid overbroad requests, and avoid seeking the production
of attorney-client privileged material; and
(2) provide reasonable accommodations based on factors such as
the size or nature of the request, the impact of the request on legitimate
business operations, or the time reasonably needed to perform a review for
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privileged or other legally protected fact information, unless doing so
would be outweighed by the government's interest in avoiding delay.
(e) The prosecutor should ensure that materials received pursuant to a
subpoena are properly stored, logged or indexed, and are readily retrievable.
(f) The prosecutor should accept copies of documents subject to a
subpoena unless there is a specific need for original documents that outweighs the
producing party's need and right to retain its original materials.
(g) The prosecutor should provide copies, or if necessary, reasonable
access to copies or original documents to the person or entity who has produced
the copies or originals.
(h) The prosecutor should seek to minimize the cost and dislocation
suffered by a person or entity to whom a subpoena is issued and, where applicable,
should inform the person or entity of any right to compensation allowed by law.
(i) The prosecutor should arrange for the return of subpoenaed documents
and materials when the purpose for which they were subpoenaed has ended.
(j) The prosecutor involved in an investigation where police or law
enforcement agents have legal authority to issue written requests for various
records and data without probable cause or judicial oversight, should provide
advice as to whether the proposed use of such authority is consistent with the
limits of the applicable law, the Constitution, and the circumstances of the
investigation.
STANDARD 2.8 SEARCH WARRANTS
(a) As used in these Standards a "search warrant" is a written command
issued by a judge or magistrate that permits law enforcement agents to search
specified persons or premises and seize specified effects and information.
(b) The prosecutor should consider the following potential benefits
associated with using a search warrant:
(1) securing evidence that might otherwise be removed, hidden,
altered or destroyed;
(2) removing contraband from commerce before it is transferred
or used;
(3) seeing and documenting the precise location of the items to be
seized in their natural or unaltered state or location;
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(4) obtaining statements by individuals at the scene of the search
that might further the investigation;
(5) observing and recording the presence of individuals found
together at the scene of the search as evidence of their coordination; and
(6) encouraging other culpable individuals or witnesses to come
forward and provide information to the investigation.
(c) The prosecutor should consider the following potential costs and risks
before applying for a search warrant:
(1) the extensive utilization of limited government resources
during the preparation and execution of a search warrant, as compared
with other means of gathering information, such as a subpoena;
(2) the intrusive nature of the execution of the warrant and its
impact on personal privacy or on legitimate business operations;
(3) the impact of execution of the warrant on innocent third parties
who may be on the premises at the time the warrant is executed; and
(4) the potential danger or harm to third parties.
(d) When the prosecutor is involved in an investigation, the prosecutor
should review search warrant applications prior to their submission to a judicial
officer. In all other cases, the prosecutor should encourage police and law
enforcement agents to seek prosecutorial review and approval of search warrants
prior to their submission to a judicial officer.
(e) In jurisdictions that authorize telephonic warrants, the prosecutor
should be familiar with the rules governing the use of such warrants and should be
available to confer with law enforcement agents about them.
(f) In reviewing a search warrant application, the prosecutor should:
(1) seek to assure the affidavit is complete, accurate and legally
sufficient;
(2) seek to determine the veracity of the affiant and the accuracy
of the information, especially when the application is based on information
from a confidential informant; and
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(3) seek to ensure that the affidavit is not misleading and does not
omit material information which has a significant bearing on probable
cause.
(g) The prosecutor involved in the investigation should:
(1) generally, if time permits, meet in advance with all law
enforcement and other personnel who will participate in the execution of
the warrant to explain the scope of the warrant, including the area(s) to be
searched and the items to be seized;
(2) consistent with the goals of the investigation, provide
legitimate business operations and third parties reasonable access to
seized records;
(3) avoid becoming a necessary percipient witness at the scene of
the execution of the warrant but be readily available and accessible to
respond to immediate questions or to assist in the preparation of additional
warrant applications;
(4) seek to ensure that an inventory is filed as required by relevant
rules; and
(5) seek to preserve exculpatory evidence obtained during a search
and consider the impact of such evidence on the criminal investigation.
(h) When searching an attorney's office, or any place where attorney-
client or other privileged material is likely to be located or is discovered, the
prosecutor should arrange for evidence to be recovered in such manner as to
prevent or minimize any unauthorized intrusion into confidential relationships or
information privileged under law.
(i) The prosecutor should seek to prevent or minimize the disclosure of
information to the public which a person or entity may consider private or
proprietary.
(j) The prosecutor should consider seeking to delay notice about the
execution of a search warrant if such delay is authorized by law and if prompt
disclosure of the execution of the warrant could reasonably be expected to result
in:
(1) the endangerment of life or physical safety of an individual;
(2) the intimidation of potential witnesses;
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(3) the flight from prosecution by a target of any investigation;
(4) the destruction of or tampering with evidence in any
investigation; or
(5) any other serious jeopardy to an investigation.
(k) The prosecutor should not notify media representatives of a search
before it occurs and should advise law enforcement agents acting with the
prosecutor in the investigation not to do so.
(1) The prosecutor should consider whether the papers supporting the
search warrant should be sealed after the warrant is executed and should make
application to do so only when the prosecutor believes that the public's interest in
knowing of the warrant is outweighed by the need to maintain secrecy of the
investigation or to prevent unfair publicity to the persons or organizations whose
premises were searched.
STANDARD 2.9 USE OF THE INVESTIGATIVE POWERS OF THE GRAND JURY
(a) In deciding whether to use a grand jury, the prosecutor should consider
the potential benefits of the power of the grand jury to compel testimony or elicit
other evidence by:
(1) conferring immunity upon witnesses;
(2) obtaining evidence in a confidential forum;
(3) obtaining evidence from a witness who elects not to speak
voluntarily to the police or prosecutor;
(4) obtaining documentary or testimonial evidence with the added
reliability provided by the oath and the secrecy requirements of the grand
jury;
(5) obtaining documentary evidence from a third party that may
be difficult to obtain from a target; and
(6) preserving witnesses' accounts in the form of sworn testimony
where the jurisdiction provides for recording or transcription of the
proceedings.
(b) In deciding whether to use a grand jury, the prosecutor should consider
the potential risks including:
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(1) revealing the existence or direction of an investigation;
(2) obtaining evasive or untruthful testimony from witnesses who
are loyal to targets or fearful of them;
(3) relying on witnesses to obey the commands of subpoenas
directing them to produce documents or physical evidence;
(4) granting immunity to witnesses:
(i) who are not believed culpable at the time of the grant but are
later found to be culpable; or
(ii) who are later found to be more culpable than the prosecutor
believed at the time of the grant;
(5) exposing grand jury witnesses to reputational, economic or
physical reprisal; and
(6) exposing grand jury witnesses to collateral consequences such
as lost time from employment or family obligations, financial costs of
compliance, and potential damage to their reputation from association with
a criminal investigation.
(c) In pursuing an investigation through the grand jury, the prosecutor
should:
(1) only bring a matter before the grand jury with the primary
purpose of seeking justice and to be mindful of the ex parte nature of
proceedings;
(2) prepare adequately before conducting grand jury examinations;
(3) know and follow the laws of the jurisdiction and the rules,
practices, and policies of the prosecutor's office;
(4) pose only legal and proper questions and, if within the
knowledge of the prosecutor questioning may elicit a privileged or self-
incriminating response, advise the witness of the existence of the
applicable privilege; and
(5) unless prohibited by the law of the jurisdiction, ensure that
grand jury proceedings are recorded.
(d) The prosecutor should use grand jury processes fairly and should:
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(1) treat grand jurors with courtesy and give them the opportunity
to have appropriate questions answered; however, the prosecutor should
not allow questions that:
(i) elicit facts about the investigation that should not become
known to the witness; or
(ii) call for privileged, prejudicial, misleading or irrelevant
evidence;
(2) issue a subpoena ad testificandum only if the prosecutor
intends to bring the witness before the grand jury;
(3) refrain from issuing a subpoena that is excessively broad or
immaterial to the legitimate scope of the grand jury's inquiry;
(4) make reasonable efforts before a witness appears at the grand
jury to determine that the testimony is needed, including offering the
witness or witness' counsel a voluntary pre-appearance conference;
(5) grant reasonable requests for extensions of dates for
appearance and production of documents when doing so does not impede
the grand jury's investigation; and
(6) resist dilatory tactics by witnesses that undermine the grand
jury's investigation, authority, or credibility.
(e) The prosecutor should examine witnesses with courtesy and in a
manner designed to elicit truthful testimony, and should:
(1) consider warning a witness suspected of perjury of the
obligations to tell the truth;
(2) insist upon definite answers that will:
(i) fully inform the members of grand jury; and
(ii) establish a clear record so that a witness committing perjury or
contempt can be held responsible for such actions;
(3) inform grand jury witnesses of their right to consult with their
attorneys to the extent provided by the policy, procedure or law of the
jurisdiction; and
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(4) seek a compulsion order only when the testimony sought is in
the public interest, there is no other reasonable way to elicit such
testimony, and the witness has refused to testify or has indicated an intent
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.
(f) In determining whether obtaining testimony from a culpable witness
will outweigh the cost of granting immunity, a prosecutor should consider the
following factors:
(1) the relative culpability of the witness to be immunized as
compared with the person against whom the testimony will be offered;
(2) the gravity of the crime(s) being investigated;
(3) the probability that the testimony would advance the
investigation or an eventual prosecution;
(4) the gravity of the crime(s) for which the witness would be
granted immunity;
(5) the character and history of the witness being considered for
immunity, including how these factors might affect the witness's
credibility;
(6) the scope of the immunity that the witness would receive;
(7) the risk that the immunized witness would lie or feign lack of
memory;
(8) the risk that the immunized witness would falsely claim
responsibility for criminal acts committed by another; and
(9) the potential for the grand jury testimony to enhance truthful
testimony by hostile or reluctant witnesses at trial or provide evidence to
prove perjury if a witness lies at trial.
(g) Ordinarily, the prosecutor should not seek to compel testimony from a
close relative of a target of an investigation by threatening prosecution or offering
immunity, unless:
(1) the relative participated criminally in an offense or criminal
enterprise with the target and the testimony sought would relate to that
enterprise's activities;
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(2) the testimony sought relates to a crime involving overriding
prosecutorial concerns; or
(3) comparable testimony is not readily available from other
sources
(h) Ordinarily, the prosecutor should give notice to a target of a grand jury
investigation and offer the opportunity for the target to testify without immunity
before the grand jury. However, notice need not be provided if there is a
reasonable possibility it will result in flight of the target, endanger other persons,
or obstruct justice. Prior to taking a target's testimony, the prosecutor should
advise the target of the privilege against self-incrimination and obtain a waiver of
that right.
(i) A prosecutor with personal knowledge of non-frivolous evidence that
directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation should present or
otherwise disclose that evidence to the grand jury. If evidence is provided to the
prosecutor by the subject or target of the investigation and the prosecutor decides
not to provide the evidence to the grand jury, the prosecutor should notify the
subject, target or their counsel of that decision without delay, so long as doing so
would not jeopardize the investigation or prosecution or endanger others.
STANDARD 2.10 TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE
(a) As used in these Standards, "technologically-assisted physical
surveillance" includes: video surveillance, tracking devices, illumination devices,
telescopic devices, and detection devices.
(b) In deciding whether to use technologically-assisted physical
surveillance, the prosecutor should consider the potential benefits, including:
(1) detecting the criminal possession of objects that are dangerous
or difficult to locate; and
(2) seeing or tracing criminal activity by means that are minimally
intrusive and limiting the risks posed to the public and law enforcement
personnel.
(c) In deciding whether to use technologically-assisted physical
surveillance, the prosecutor should consider the legal and privacy implications for
subjects, victims and third parties. The prosecutor should seek to use such
surveillance techniques in proportion to the seriousness of the criminal activity
being investigated and the needs of the particular investigation and in a manner
designed to be minimally intrusive.
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(d) In deciding whether to use technologically-assisted physical
surveillance, the prosecutor should consider the legal requirements applicable to
the technique under consideration, and whether those requirements have been met.
STANDARD 2.11 CONSENSUAL INTERCEPTION, TRANSMISSION AND
RECORDING OF COMMUNICATIONS
(a) As used in these Standards "consensual interception" is an electronic,
digital, audio or video interception and recording of communications to which one
or more but not all participants in the communications has consented.
(b) In deciding whether to use consensual interception, the prosecutor
should consider the potential benefits, including obtaining direct, incriminating,
and credible evidence that can be used alone or to corroborate other information.
(c) In deciding whether to use consensual interception, the prosecutor
should consider the potential risks, including:
(1) problems of audibility and admissibility;
(2) the danger of detection, including physical risk to those
participating, and the risk of disclosure of the investigation;
(3) selective recording of communications by the cooperating
party;
(4) the danger of obtaining false, misleading or self-serving
statements by a party to the conversation who is aware or suspects that the
conversation is being recorded;
(5) the risk that the consenting individual will conspire with the
subject of the investigation to create false or misleading statements; and
(6) the risk that the import of a conversation will be distorted by
the cooperating party.
(d) To maximize the benefits and to minimize the risks of using
consensual interception, the prosecutor should:
(1) obtain written or recorded consent from the consenting
individual; and
(2) minimize to the extent practicable recording outside the
presence of law enforcement agents and, if such a recording occurs or will
occur:
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(i) have law enforcement agents test and activate the recording
equipment before the cooperating party meets with the subject;
and
(ii) minimize the necessity for the cooperating party to operate the
recording equipment and, if it is necessary for the cooperating
party to operate the equipment, provide that individual specific
directions on how to operate the equipment and strict instruction to
be present with it during such operation.
(e) The prosecutor, in consultation with the law enforcement agents,
should regularly review all or selected recordings obtained during consensual
interceptions.
(f) The prosecutor should take steps to ensure law enforcement agents
comply with procedures relating to the acquisition of, custody of, and access to
electronic equipment and recording media and to the secure preservation of any
recordings produced whether they are obtained by consenting individuals or by law
enforcement agents.
STANDARD 2.12 NON-CONSENSUAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
(a) As used in these Standards "non-consensual electronic surveillance" is
the court-ordered interception of communications, actions, or events.
(b) In deciding whether to request a court order for non-consensual
electronic surveillance, the prosecutor should consider the potential benefit of
obtaining direct, incriminating, and credible evidence that can be used alone or to
corroborate other information.
(c) In deciding whether to request a court order for non-consensual
electronic surveillance, the prosecutor should consider the potential costs and risks,
including:
(1) whether the suspected criminal activity being investigated is
sufficiently serious and persistent to justify:
(i) the significant intrusion on the privacy interests of targets and
innocent third parties;
(ii)the need to obtain periodic reauthorization for electronic
surveillance; and
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(iii) the financial and resource costs associated with such
surveillance.
(2) whether all requirements of the law are met.
(d) The prosecutor, including an applicant, should be aware of the
reporting requirements under federal and state law and heightened obligations and
accountability to the court in connection with the application and use of non-
consensual electronic surveillance.
(e) Prior to the initiation of non-consensual electronic surveillance, the
prosecutor should review the following with the law enforcement agents and
contract personnel such as interpreters who will assist in the execution of the order:
(1) the scope of the order;
(2) obligations of the monitoring law enforcement agents and
monitoring personnel to minimize the interception of privileged
conversations and other conversations outside the scope of the order and to
alert the prosecutor promptly when recording evidence of new crimes;
(3) the prohibition on listening without recording;
(4) rules related to protecting the integrity and chain of custody of
recordings;
(5) instructions to contact the prosecutor whenever a noteworthy
event occurs, or there is a question regarding the execution of the order;
and
(6) the need to adhere to non-disclosure requirements.
(f) The prosecutor should stay informed of actions of law enforcement
agents and contract personnel throughout the use of non-consensual electronic
surveillance and should take appropriate steps to determine whether the required
procedures are being followed by those carrying out the surveillance.
STANDARD 2.13 CONDUCTING PARALLEL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS
(a) In deciding whether to conduct a criminal investigation and throughout
any such investigation that is undertaken, the prosecutor should consider whether
society's interest in the matter might be better or equally vindicated by available
civil, regulatory, administrative, or private remedies.
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(b) When doing so would not compromise a proper prosecutorial interest,
and to the degree permitted by law, the prosecutor should cooperate with other
governmental authorities regarding their investigations for the purpose of
instituting remedial actions that are of legitimate concern to such entities. In the
course of such cooperation, the prosecutor:
(1) should retain sole control of the criminal investigation and
maintain independent judgment at all times;
(2) should be aware of rules that prohibit or restrict the sharing or
disclosure of information or material gathered through certain criminal
investigative techniques;
(3) should not be a party to nor allow the continuation of efforts
by civil investigative agencies or attorneys to use the criminal process for
the purpose of obtaining a civil settlement; and
(4) may, in order to preserve the integrity of a criminal
investigation or prosecution, ask a civil investigative agency to refrain
from taking an investigative step or bringing an action but, in considering
whether to do so, should consider the detriment to the public that may
result from such forbearance.
(c) A prosecutor should consider the appropriateness of non-criminal or
global (civil and criminal resolutions) dispositions suggested by subjects or targets,
whether or not they choose to cooperate, and may consider proposals by them to
include civil or regulatory sanctions as part of a disposition or cooperation
agreement.
STANDARD 2.14 TERMINATING THE INVESTIGATION, RETENTION OF EVIDENCE
AND POST-INVESTIGATION ANALYSIS
(a) The prosecutor should diligently pursue the timely conclusion of
criminal investigations.
(b) The prosecutor's office should periodically review matters under
investigation in the office and determine whether the interests of justice would be
served by terminating the investigation.
(c) The prosecutor should determine whether information obtained in
investigations should be made available for civil enforcement purposes,
administrative remedies, or for other purposes consistent with law and the public
interest.
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(d) To the extent feasible, the prosecutor and members of the investigative
agencies should analyze investigations retrospectively, to evaluate techniques and
steps that worked well or that proved to be deficient.
(e) Post-investigation analysis by the prosecutor's office should include
seeking to identify ways other than prosecution to prevent, minimize or deter
similar crimes from occurring in the future.
(f) Prosecutors should be aware of the requirements and office practices
regarding the preservation of investigative records and of their compliance
obligations with regard to information access and privacy law provisions.
(g) To the extent practicable, the prosecutor should, upon request, provide
notice of termination of the investigation to subjects who became aware of the
investigation.
(h) Upon termination of the investigation and related proceedings,
physical evidence other than contraband should be returned promptly to the person
from whom it was obtained, absent anagreement, court order or requirement of
law to the contrary.
STANDARD 2.15 GUIDANCE AND TRAINING FOR LINE PROSECUTORS
(a) A prosecutor's office should be organized in a manner to provide line
prosecutors guidance consistent with these Standards.
(b) To guide the exercise of discretion, a prosecutor's office should:
(1) encourage consultation and collaboration among prosecutors;
(2) appoint supervisors with appropriate experience, strong skills
and a commitment to justice and ethical behavior;
(3) require consultation and approval at appropriate supervisory
levels for investigative methods of different levels of intrusiveness, risk
and costs;
(4) provide regular supervisory review throughout the course of
investigations;
(5) regularly review investigative techniques and promote best
practices to reflect changes in law and policy;
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(6) create and implement internal policies, procedures, and
standard practices that teach and reinforce standards of excellence in
performance, professionalism, and ethics;
(7) create and implement policies and procedures that protect
against practices that could result in unfair hardships, the pursuit of
baseless investigations, and the bringing of charges against the innocent;
(8) develop and support practices designed to prevent and to
rectify conviction of the innocent.
(9) determine what types of investigative steps require formal
supervisory approval, and at what supervisory level, and
(10) require line attorneys to consult with supervisors or
experienced colleagues when making significant investigative decisions
absert exigent circumstances.
(c) A prosecutor's office should provide guidance and training by:
(1) strongly encouraging consultation and collaboration among
line assistants;
(2) appointing supervisors with appropriate experience and strong
commitments to justice, and fostering close working relationships between
supervisors and those they supervise;
(3) providing formal training programs on investigative
techniques and the ethical choices implicated in using them; and
(4) creating internal policies and standard practices regarding
investigations that memorialize and reinforce standards of excellence,
professionalism, and ethics. In doing so:
(i) policy and practice materials should be regularly reviewed and
updated and should allow flexibility for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, and
(ii) written policies and procedures should not be a substitute for
regular training for all office members and a commitment to
mentoring less-experienced attorneys.
(d) When a line prosecutor believes the needs of an investigation or some
extraordinary circumstance require actions that are contrary to or outside of
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existing policies, the prosecutor should seek prior approval before taking such
actions.
(e) A prosecutor's office should develop policies and procedures that
address the initiation and implementation of the investigative tools discussed in
these Standards in advance of the specific needs of an investigation.
STANDARD 2.16 SPECIAL PROSECUTORS, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AND
SPECIAL PROSECUTION UNITS
(a) As used in these Standards, a "special prosecutor" or an "independent
counsel" is a prosecutor serving independently from the general prosecution office
under a particularized appointment and whose service in that role typically ends
after the purpose of the appointment is completed. A "special prosecution unit" is
typically a unit that focuses on a particular type of crime, criminal activity, or
victim.
(b) Although the special prosecutor and the special prosecution unit are
removed from the responsibilities of a general prosecution office, a prosecutor in
this role should:
(1) be bound by the same policies and procedures as regular
prosecutors in their jurisdiction, unless to do so would be incompatible
with their duties;
(2) base judgments about the merits of pursuing a particular
investigation upon the same factors that should guide a regular prosecutor,
including the seriousness of the offense, the harm to the public, and the
expenditure of public resources; and
(3) in choosing matters to investigate, consider the danger that the
narrow focus or limited jurisdiction of the prosecutor or the unit will lead
to the pursuit of what would, in a general prosecution office, be considered
an insubstantial violation, or one more appropriately resolved by civil or
administrative actions.
STANDARD 2.17 USE OF INFORMATION, MONEY, OR RESOURCES PROVIDED BY
NON-GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES
(a) The prosecutor may use information provided by non-governmental
sources that is pertinent to a potential or existing criminal investigation. However,
consistent with the principles in Standard 2.1, the prosecutor should make an
independent evaluation of the information and make an independent decision as to
whether to allocate or continue to allocate resources to investigating the matter.
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(b) If the law of the jurisdiction permits the acceptance of financial or
resource assistance from non-governmental sources, the decision to accept such
assistance should be made with caution by the chief public prosecutor or an
accountable designee after careful consideration of:
(1) the extent to which the law of the jurisdiction permits the
acceptance of financial or resource assistance;
(2) the extent to which the offer is in the public interest, as
opposed to an effort to achieve the limited private interests of the non-
governmental sources;
(3) the extent to which acceptance may result in foregoing other
cases;
(4) the potential adverse impact on the equal administration of the
criminal law;
(5) the extent to which the character and magnitude of the
assistance might unduly influence the prosecutor's subsequent exercise of
investigative and prosecutorial discretion;
(6) the likelihood that the community may view accepting the
assistance as inconsistent with the fair and equal administration of criminal
justice;
(i) the likelihood that accepting assistance from private sources
may create an appearance of undue influence over law
enforcement; and
(7) the extent to which financial or resource assistance would
enhance or enable the investigation of criminal activity;
(c) The prosecutor should consider the risk that encouraging information
gathering from non-governmental sources may lead to abusive, dangerous or even
criminal actions by private parties.
(d) The office of the prosecutor should have procedures designed to
protect the independent exercise of investigative discretion from being influenced
by the receipt of outside financial or resource assistance, including careful
accounting and recordkeeping of the amounts and terms of such assistance and
clear disclosure that providing assistance will not guide the exercise of
investigative or prosecutorial discretion.
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(e) The prosecutor, consistent with the law of the jurisdiction, should
disclose significant non-governmental assistance to relevant legislative or public
bodies having oversight over the prosecutor's office and, when appropriate, the
public.
(f) Non-governmental assistance should be disclosed to affected parties as
part of the discovery process.
STANDARD 2.18 USE OF SENSITIVE, CLASSIFIED OR OTHER INFORMATION
IMPLICATING INVESTIGATIVE PRIVILEGES
(a) The prosecutor should be alert to the need to balance the government's
legitimate interests in protecting certain information from disclosure, and the
legitimate interests and Constitutional rights of the public and of defendants
favoring disclosure.
(b) When appropriate, the prosecutor should request court orders designed
to protect the disclosure of law enforcement means and methods, informant
identities, observation posts, and such other information that might jeopardize
future investigations or the safety or reputation of persons directly or indirectly
involved in an investigation.
(c) In investigations believed to have the potential to include classified or
sensitive information, prosecutors should seek to obtain the relevant information
and consult laws, regulations and other requirements for handling such information
before making any charging decisions.
PART 3: PROSECUTOR'S ROLE IN RESOLVING INVESTIGATION PROBLEMS
STANDARD 3.1 PROSECUTOR'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING LAW ENFORCEMENT
MISCONDUCT
(a) If the prosecutor has reason to suspect misconduct or unauthorized
illegal activity at any level of the prosecutor's office or in any agency or
department engaged in a criminal investigation, the prosecutor should promptly
report the suspicion and the reason for it to appropriate supervisory personnel in
the prosecutor's office who have authority to address the problem, or to the
appropriate inspector general's office, or similar agency, if reporting within the
prosecutor's own office is problematic. Reporting may also be required to comply
with requirements of the applicable rules of professional conduct, the Model Rules
and the law of the jurisdiction.
(b) If the prosecutor has reason to believe that a criminal investigation or
prosecution is, or is likely to be, adversely affected by incompetence, lack of
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skilled personnel or inadequate resources in the prosecutor's office or in any other
relevant agency or department, the prosecutor should promptly report that belief
and the reason for it to supervisory personnel in the prosecutor's office.
(c) A supervisory prosecutor who receives an allegation of misconduct,
unauthorized illegal conduct, or who receives an allegation of incompetence,
inadequate resources, or lack of skilled personnel that is, or is likely to, adversely
affect a criminal investigation, should undertake a prompt and objective review of
the facts and circumstances or refer the matter to an appropriate agency or
component responsible for addressing such allegations. When practicable, the line
prosecutor making any such allegations should not be involved in subsequent
investigation(s) relating to the allegation(s).
(d) If the prosecutor's office concludes that there is a reasonable belief
that personnel in any agency or department have engaged in unauthorized illegal
conduct, the prosecutor's office should initiate a criminal investigation into the
conduct or seek the initiation of such an investigation by an appropriate outside
agency or office.
(e) If the prosecutor's office concludes that there was not unauthorized
illegal conduct, but concludes that there was incompetence or non-criminal
misconduct, the prosecutor's office should take appropriate action to notify the
relevant agency or department, and if within the prosecutor's own office, to impose
sanctions for the conduct.
(f) Decisions on how to respond to allegations of unauthorized illegal
conduct, misconduct, or significant incompetence should generally be made
without regard to adverse consequences on pending cases or investigations.
STANDARD 3.2 PROSECUTOR'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING SUSPECTED JUDICIAL
MISCONDUCT
(a) Although judges are not exempt from criminal investigation, the
prosecutor's office should protect against the use of false allegations as a means of
harassment or abuse that may impact the independence of the judiciary.
(b) If a line prosecutor has reason to believe that there is significant
misconduct or illegal activity by a member of the judiciary, the line prosecutor
should promptly report that belief and the reasons for it to supervisory personnel in
the prosecutor's office.
(c) Upon receiving from a line prosecutor, or from any source, an
allegation of significant misconduct or illegal conduct by a member of the
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judiciary, a supervisory prosecutor should undertake a prompt and objective
review of the facts and circumstances.
(d) If the prosecutor's office has a reasonable belief that a member of the
judiciary has engaged in criminal conduct, the prosecutor's office should initiate,
or seek the initiation of, a criminal investigation.
(e) If the prosecutor's office concludes that a member of the judiciary has
not engaged in illegal conduct, but has engaged in non-criminal misconduct, the
prosecutor's office should take appropriate action to inform the relevant officer of
the judicial authorities. Reporting may also be required to comply with
requirements of the applicable rules of professional conduct, the Model Rules and
the law of the jurisdiction.
(f) The prosecutor's office should take reasonable steps to assure the
independence of any investigation of a judge before whom the prosecutor's office
practices. In some instances, this may require the appointment of a "pro tem" or
"special" prosecutor or use of a "fire-wall" within the prosecutor's office.
STANDARD 3.3 PROSECUTOR'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING SUSPECTED MISCONDUCT
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL
(a) Although defense counsel are not exempt from criminal investigation,
the prosecutor's office should protect against the use of false allegations as a
means of harassment or abuse that may impact the independence of the defense
counsel or the Constitutionally protected right to counsel.
(b) If a line prosecutor has reason to believe that defense counsel is
engaging in criminal conduct, is violating the duty to protect a client, or is
engaging in unethical behavior or misconduct, the prosecutor should promptly
report that belief and the reasons for it to supervisory personnel in the prosecutor's
office.
(c) Upon receiving from a line prosecutor, or from any source, an
allegation of misconduct or illegal conduct by defense counsel, a supervisory
prosecutor should undertake a prompt and objective review of the facts and
circumstances.
(d) If the prosecutor's office has a reasonable belief that defense counsel
has engaged in illegal conduct, the prosecutor's office should initiate, or seek the
initiation of, an investigation into the conduct.
(e) If the prosecutor's office concludes that defense counsel has not
engaged in illegal conduct, but has engaged in non-criminal misconduct as defined
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by the governing ethical code and the rules of the jurisdiction, the prosecutor's
office should take appropriate action to inform the appropriate disciplinary
authority.
(f) The prosecutor's office should take reasonable steps to assure the
independence of any investigation of a defense counsel including, if appropriate,
the appointment of a pro tern or special prosecutor or use of a "fire-wall" within
the prosecutor's office. At a minimum, an investigation of defense counsel's
conduct should be conducted by a prosecutor who has not been involved in the
initial matter or in ongoing matters with that defense counsel.
(g) The prosecutor investigating defense counsel should consider whether
information regarding conduct by defense counsel should be provided to a judicial
officer involved in overseeing aspects of the investigation in which the misconduct
occurred.
(h) The prosecutor investigating defense counsel who is representing a
client in a criminal matter under the jurisdiction of the prosecutor's office
ordinarily should notify the attorney and the court in a timely manner about the
possibility that potential charges against the attorney may create a conflict of
interest.
STANDARD 3.4 PROSECUTOR'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING SUSPECTED MISCONDUCT
BY WITNESSES, INFORMANTS OR JURORS
(a) If a line prosecutor has reason to believe that there has been illegal
conduct or non-criminal misconduct by witnesses, informants, or jurors, the
prosecutor should seek supervisory review of the matter.
(b) Upon receiving an allegation of unauthorized illegal conduct or non-
criminal misconduct by witnesses, informants or jurors, the prosecutor's office
should undertake a prompt and objective review. If there is a reasonable belief that
there has been illegal conduct or non-criminal misconduct, the prosecutor's office
should initiate an investigation into the conduct. All relevant evidence should be
preserved in the event it must be disclosed if criminal charges are filed against the
individual alleged to have engaged in the conduct.
(c) If the misconduct relates to the official duties of a juror or witness, it
must also be reported to an appropriate judicial officer.
STANDARD 3.5 ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
(a) If a prosecutor reasonably believes that evidence has been illegally
obtained, the prosecutor should consider whether there are potential criminal acts
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that should be investigated or misconduct that should be addressed or reported.
The prosecutor should be familiar with the laws of their jurisdiction regarding the
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.
(b) The prosecutor should take appropriate steps to limit the taint, if any,
from the illegally obtained evidence and determine if the evidence may still be
lawfully used.
(c) The prosecutor should notify the parties affected by the illegal conduct
at the earliest time that will not compromise the investigation or subsequent
investigation, or at an earlier time if required by law.
STANDARD 3.6 RESPONDING TO POLITICAL PRESSURE AND CONSIDERATION OF
THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS ON THE POLITICAL
PROCESS
(a) The prosecutor should resist political pressure intended to influence
the conduct, focus, duration or outcome of a criminal investigation.
(b) The prosecutor should generally not make decisions related to a
criminal investigation based upon their impact on the political process
(c) When, due to the nature of the investigation or the identity of
investigative targets, any decision will have some impact on the political process
(such as an impending election), the prosecutor should make decisions and use
discretion in a principled manner and in a manner designed to limit the political
impact without regard to the prosecutor's personal political beliefs or affiliations.
(d) The prosecutor should carefully consider the language in Standard 1.5
("Contacts with the Public During the Investigative Process") when making any
statements or reports regarding a decision to prosecute, or to decline to prosecute,
in a matter that may have some impact on the political process.
STANDARD 3.7 REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS BY
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS
(a) Prosecutors' offices should attempt to respond in a timely, open, and
candid manner to requests from public officials for general information about the
enforcement of laws under their jurisdiction or about law reform matters.
However, if public officials seek information about ongoing or impending
investigations, the prosecutors' offices should consider the potential negative
impact of providing such information and should inform public officials about
such concerns.
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(b) Generally, responses to public officials should be made by high-
ranking officials in the prosecutor's office who have policy-making authority.
Prosecutors' offices should resist allowing line-attorneys to respond to requests for
information by public officials.
(c) Generally, responses to information requests by public officials should
be through testimony or by providing pertinent statistics and descriptive and
analytical reports, and not by providing information about particular matters.
Prosecutors' offices should resist requests for materials that are subject to
deliberative process or work product privileges related to pending criminal
investigations or closed investigations whose materials have not otherwise been
made public, and should oppose disclosure of information that would adversely
affect a person or entity.
(d) Prosecutor's offices may respond to requests about the handling of
fully adjudicated cases. Absent unusual circumstances, information about
adjudicated cases should be provided by high-ranking officials with policy-making
authority, and not by line attorneys.
(e) The Prosecutor's office should establish clear and consistent policies
to address its responsibilities under public disclosure laws and with regard to the
public's potential access to closed matters. The Prosecutor's office should provide
sufficient resources to make prompt and appropriate replies to any public
disclosure requests.
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